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I. INTRODUCTION

A MERGER in an industry with differentiated products increases the market
power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes

and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes.' Such a merger
makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper, by shifting each in

the direction of the industry demand curve.2 The extent of this increase in
market power depends upon the own-elasticity of demand for each merging
firm's product, as well as the cross-elasticity of demand for each with all other
firms' products. As a result, evaluating the effect of a merger between two firms
with n-2 other competitors would seem to require the estimation of at least n2
parameters (all of the price elasticities of demand), a formidable task.
That extremely difficult estimation task is unnecessary, however. The

necessary information is contained in the slopes of the two single-firm (residual)
demand curves before the merger, and the extent to which the merged firm will

face a steeper demand curve. For example, suppose a merger between two U.S.

brewing firms, say Pabst and Anheuser-Busch, were proposed. It is not
particularly important to determine whether it is competition from Miller or
competition from Stroh (or from Heileman, or .. .) which puts the most effective

brake on Anheuser-Busch's pricing. Only the total effect of these other firms
and the particular effect of competition from Pabst are of interest.
This paper proposes econometric procedures for estimating the demand
system that merger partners will face, based only on pre-merger data. The key

to the procedures is that the effects of all other firms in the industry are summed
together. Formally, we start with a model of an n-firm product-differentiated
industry. Manipulation of the model removes the prices and quantities of all

but two firms. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem to manageable
size; rather than an n-firm demand system, we estimate a two-firm residual
demand system. In this way the technique extends our econometric method for
* We would like to thank Paul Geroski and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier
draft. Acknowledged is grant support from the Sloan Foundation to the Department of Economics
at Stanford University.

1 This definition of the increase in market power from a merger ignores possible changes in
industry conduct resulting from the change in inrdustry structure. If the merger raises the 4ikelihood
of collusion (Stigler [I964]), the definition underestimates the change in market power. If the
merger induces entry by new firms or competitive product introductions by existing firms, the
definition overestimates the change in market power.
2 Our definition of the residual demand curve is distinct from, but closely related to, Chamberlin's

[I933] dd'. We make the distinction precise in Note 6 below.
427
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evaluating single-firm demand elasticities in product-differentiated industries

(Baker and Bresnahan [I984]).
Throughout, we do not distinguish a merger between two firms from a

bilateral collusive arrangement between them. We use the language "the
increase in market power from a merger" but could equally well use the phrase
"the gains from a bilateral collusive arrangement between these two firms".
We apply our technique to three U.S. brewing firms: Anheuser-Busch
(A-B), Pabst and Coors. Since U.S. brewing is quite concentrated, and since

all of these firms are large,3 a merger between any two of the three would lik
be challenged under current U.S. antitrust guidelines. The question of bilateral
collusion is therefore more interesting. Our estimates show that neither of the

two smaller firms, Pabst and Coors, would have a significant increase in market

power from bilateral collusion, although A-B would gain substantially from
colluding with either of the other two.

II. TWO FIRMS IN A PRODUCT-DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRY

This section derives the residual demand curve facing two firms in a productdifferentiated industry. The residual demand curve is the relationship between
those two firms' prices and quantities, taking the reactions of all other firms into

account. This is a natural generalization of the residual demand curve facing
a single firm: the relationship between its price and quantity, taking other
firms' reactions into account. In product-differentiated industries, it is natural

to suppose that there will be a (private) gain to merger, because the merged

firm will face a steeper residual demand curve.4
A simple location model of product differentiation can illustrate these ideas.

Suppose stores are distributed along a road as in Figure I (a). The road goes on

forever, but we show only the four firms at locations el, e2, {3 and e4. Each

initially charges the price P0. Customers need to travel to the stores; their costs

per mile are given by the slopes of the delivered-price lines. Customer C12 iS just

indifferent between going to store I or 2, but everyone located to the right of
c12 would rather buy at store 2 than store i. Suppose that competition in the
industry takes the Bertrand (price) form, and that the stores are spaced such

that the reaction functions have slope + -. That is, every store would respond
to a price increase by either of its neighbors with a price increase 3 as large.

To define the residual demand curve facing firm 2, suppose that firm 2'S costs

increased, leading it to increase its price to P1. After all other stores have
reached equilibrium, both of firm 2's neighbors will have increased their prices

by slightly over 3 as much.5 Figure I (b) shows that firm 2 will lose customers
to both stores I and 3. The slope of firm 2's residual demand curve can be
3In i983, Anheuser-Busch had a 32.9 percent national market share (in unit sales), Coors 7.5
percent, and Pabst 7.0 percent.

4 This presumption is typically false in homogeneous-product industries. See Salant et al. [ I 983] .
It is slightly over 3 because store 3's increase leads to an increase by 4, which feeds back to 3,
and so on.
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6The slope of the residual demand curve is different from the slope of Cham
latter would be defined in our spatial-Bertrand context keeping other firms' prices constant. The
residual demand curve lets other firms adjust. It is possible to estimate the slope of dd' as well as a
residual demand: see, for example, Bresnahan [ I 98 I].
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would happen if the merged firm raised price. Now, customers switch from store

2 to store I but not to store 3. Similarly, store 3 loses customers to store 4 but not
to store 2. As a result, each store loses only half as many customers as it would
have acting independently. The residual demand elasticity for the merged firm
is only half that of the pre-merged firms, a considerable increase in market
power.

Any real-world product-differentiated industry is likely to be much more

complicated than this example. If there are n firms with different products in

the industry, one might expect a price increase by any one firm to lead some
customers to switch to most or all of the other n-I firms. The situation is
unlikely to be symmetric; some particular firms' products will have greater
cross-elasticities of demand than others. Further, the assumption of price
(Bertrand) competition in our example might be incorrect; firms might exhibit
Cournot or other forms of behavior. It therefore seems that calculating the
increase in market power due to a real-world merger involves an extremely
difficult econometric task. All of the own- and cross-elasticities of demand must

be estimated and the nature of competitive interaction must be determined.
Let firms I and 2 propose a merger in an industry with n-2 other firms. The
inverse demand curves for the merger partners may be written

(I) P1 = hl(Q,,Q2, 9I ; 61)
(2) P2 = h2(Ql', Q2, Q ; r 2)
Here Qis an (n-2) vector of quantities produced by all other firms, r denotes

a vector of exogenous variables which shift demand, and qi is a parameter
vector. The remaining (n-2) demand curves in this industry may be written
compactly as follows:

(3) -P= -h(QQ21, Q-2 , 0; n)
Note that estimation of (i), (2) and (3) can be very difficult. Denoting the
elasticity of hi with respect to Qj as rij, (I), (2) and (3) might be approximated
as

(I') Pi tlo +11q1l+ n21q2 + z jl qjq+<1 y, Y>,
j=3

(2') P2 = ?120+1nl2q1+ n22q2 + E qj22qj+<?2Yn, r>,
j=3

(3 ) Pi = qio + qliql + n2iq2 +L E jiqj +<qiy,.Y>, i = 3,
j=3

where qi = log(Qj), pi = log(Pi) and <, > is the inner produ

There are n2 elasticities of demand "ij, even before consider
variable elasticities, Qiy. Unless some further structure can
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and (3'), for example, by grouping firms

tion will be very difficult if not impossible.7

Next we specify the behavior of the (n-2) non-merging firms. It can be
cooperative or non-cooperative, and if non-cooperative it can be Cournot,
Bertrand, or some other oligopoly equilibrium. Each firm will satisfy a first-

order condition equating marginal cost with perceived marginal revenue. For the
non-merging firms, perceived marginal revenue, which differs across oligopoly
solution concepts, is written as follows:

(4) M R-= P + 9(Ql, Q2, Q, -r; t1) Q
In equation (4), g is a vector of slopes of the demand curves h perceived by
each of the (n- 2) non-merging firms.
Although (4) is written as if quantity were the choice variable of the

oligopolists, appropriate choice of g( ) can make (4) correspond to any
behavioral rule, including equilibria in which firms choose prices.
The vector of marginal costs for the (n- 2) non-merging firms depends on

output Q factor prices W, and parameters ,B.

(5) MC = MC(Q W, f)
Thus the first-order conditions describing the behavior of the non-merging

firms take the following form8

(6) MC(Q W; f) = P+g(Ql, Q2 Q Y; n)Q

Solving the 2 (n-2) equations in the vector relations (6) and (3) for the vect
Q2 we derive

(7) Q = E (Ql, Q2, Yr, W; )
A different equation Ej corresponds to each of the (n-2) outputs of nonmerging firms. We denote the elasticities of E. with respect to Qi (i = I, 2) as
vji; this is the elasticity of firmj's reaction function (to firm i).
Equation (7) defines a partial reduced form for the (n-2) non-merging firm

outputs; it defines equilibrium Q, given QA and Q2. Substituting equation (7)
into demand curves (i) and (2) for the merger partners, we derive partial residual
demand curves for those two firms:

(8) P1 = h1 (QA, Q2, -E(Ql, Q2, r, W; 1, /); r; 1)
= r1 (Q1, Q2' Y, W;ii1, q ,D )

(9) P2 = r2 (Q1, Q2, r, W; 112, 1,
7For methods which use such further structure, see Bresnahan [1980], Cowling and Cubbin
[I1972], and Joskow [I983], all applied to the Automobile industry.

8 Note that (6) are supply relations, functions of both P and Q. They are the analog of the
supply function P = MC(Q) in the theory of perfect competition.
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We estimate equations (8) and (9), the partial residual demand system
applicable to firms I and 2. They are residual demand curves because the actions

of firms 3 to n have been taken into account. They are partial residual demand
curves because, for each firm, the potential merger partner's action remains to

be specified. Note that this approach includes as a special case the possibility of
perfect competition. If P1 and P2 are completely explained by rand W, so that

Q, and Q2 have coefficients of zero in (8) and (9), then firms I and 2 have no
power over price, even acting jointly.

In our empirical work, we approximate (8) and (9) with log-log functional
forms

(I) PP =P lo+ll 21
qlqPR+ q2r'y+
(II) P2 = 120+ 12qPR
+i222
2V2Y+A2+v2

The interpretation of the parameters PR may be obtain
differentiating (8) and (9). This yields

(I2) 1PR = + Z j
j=3

( I) 3) =ni l 2l + E lj2ej2
j=3

(I4) n2P = 112 + Ej=3'iTei2

(I5) P2R = 122 + E lj2lj2
j=3

Thus the partial residual demand elasticities PjR depend both on the structural

demand elasticities 1ij and on the reaction function elasticities vij. By estimating
only the parameters q-PR, we obtain only a subset of the information about the
industry. For example in (I 2), we cannot separate the effects of firms 3 through
n; only the total effect enters the equation.

Calculation of post-merger market power from the partial residual demand

curve is straightforward. Suppose that the merged firm will decrease Q1 and Q2
in the same proportion to exploit its increased market power.9 Then a decrease

of both Q4 and 242 of one percent will raise P1 by 1PR + 2PR and will raise

P2 by 42P + qPR
Pre-merger (current) market power depends on the residual demand curve

facing each of firms I and 2 acting alone. Since the formal derivation closely
follows that of the partial residual demand curve, we present it in Appendix I
and just give the main ideas here. The residual demand curve facing firm I will
take the form

(i6) P1 = R1(Q4l r, W, q l, fi)
9 The merged firm may not find it optimal to decrease Q, and Q2 in the same proportion to

exploit its market power. See Orr and MacAvoy [I964] for analysis of when proportional-quantity

rules arejointly profit maximizing for two firms.
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This is exactly the same as (8), except firm 2 has been "equilibrated out" along

with firms 3 to n. The elasticity of P, with respect to Q1 defined by (i6) is il,
the residual demand elasticity for firm i.

Suppose instead of solving the 2 (n-2) equations (3) and (4) for Q3, ..., Q
we expanded them by one demand curve (2) and a first-order condition for firm

2. Then we would have 2(n - I) equations for Q2 ... .I Q. We solve for the
(n-I ) outputs as functions of Ql:
Q2

(I7) ( =E(Q, r, W; ,f3)

where (I 7) differs from (7) because Q2 is on the left, not right

of Qi with respect to Q1 in (i6) be (jl. Note that there is no ob
ship between the partial residual demand elasticity iPR and the

elasticity qR, since they are defined by different conceptual e

partial residual demand system, firm 2'S output is held fixed alon
In the residual demand curve, firm 2'S output is solved out along
other n -2 firms.

E(*) is the vector of outputs of all firms except firm i. The elasticity of firm
I Sresidual demand curve is
R

(i8) ill = 11+121l21 + E fjlXjl
j=3

We could similarly define a residual demand curve for firm 2. It would have
elasticity

(I9) R2 = 122+qh2412 + E qj24j2
j=3

To summarize, the difference between the residual demand curve facing a

single firm and the partial residual demand curve facing two firms is this: the
price discipline that each of the two firms exerts on the other is isolated. When

we estimate the residual demand curve for firm I, the slope depends (in part)

on how firm I's customers defect to firm 2. When we estimate the partial
residual demand curve, we can perform the conceptual experiment of raising
both firms' prices together. 10
Calculation of the exact, quantitative increase in market power as a result of
the merger rests on the assumption that the elasticity of demand does not
change along the demand curve. Estimates based on pre-merger historical data

cannot reveal the elasticity of demand at the hypothetical post-merger point.

What they can do is measure the extent to which the merger will change
'0In a product differentiated industry, residual demand elasticities correspond directly to a
firm's markup of price over marginal cost. For an explanation, and a discussion of other
circumstances in which the markup is related to residual demand elasticities, see Baker and
Bresnahan [ I 984, section B].
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price-quantity incentives. If the demand curve grows steeper as a result of the
merger, we can be sure that the merged firm will have an incentive to raise
price from the pre-merger level. But we cannot be sure how far; if for some

(unlikely) reason the demand curve rapidly flattens at quantities slightly below

those observed in the market, the merger will have little effect.

III. THREE BREWERS

In this section, we empirically investigate the extent to which existing competi-

tion from other firms' products limits market power in the U.S. brewing
industry. Three hypothetical mergers are considered: between Anheuser-Busch

(A-B), the largest firm in the national market, and Pabst, another important
producer of "premium" beer; between A-B and Coors, the largest firm in the

Western states; and between Pabst and Coors. " After a discussion of the
structure of the industry,12 we estimate residual demand curves for each of the
three firms, and partial residual demand curves for each of the three pairs of
firms.

The brewing industry is highly concentrated. In I983, the last year of our

sample, the two-firm (A-B and Miller) concentration ratio was over 50
percent. Four more firms (Pabst, Coors, Heileman and Schlitz) had market
shares between seven and thirteen percent. There is also considerable evidence

of product differentiation. An FTC study'13 shows substantial long-term trends
in the relative prices of different kinds of beer ("popular", "premium", etc.)
indicating they must be imperfect substitutes in demand. Similarly, the correla-

tions over time among the prices charged by our three firms suggest they are
selling distinct products. Table I reports correlation coefficients for the log of
the real price of each firm's primary brand in mid-summer in Northern

California, over the period I 962-83.
Data limitations prevent straightforward extension of our techniques to

Miller, Heileman or Stroh-Schlitz. Each of these firms has acquired a rival
or been acquired. Miller and Heileman have both been closely held within our
sample period. Thus firm-specific data on these firms cannot be assembled from
published sources.

Given the concentration and the product differentiation present in the
industry, it is natural to ask whether there are gains to collusion or merger. If

we find that coordinated pricing between two firms would substantially
increase their market power, we can draw two conclusions. First, a merger

between them would worsen industry conduct, and would therefore worsen
performance if it did not yield cost savings. Second, the firms are not now

1 l None of these hypothetical mergers is likely to occur without antitrust challenge. For a history
of brewing mergers and their antitrust treatment, see Ornstein [I 198 I ].

12 Elzinga [I982] presents a detailed review of brewing industry history. The demand for beer

has been discussed by Greer ([I97I], [I98I]), Hogarty and Elzinga [I972], Kelton and Kelton
[I1982], and McConnel [I968]. Product differentiation issues are discussed in Greer [I98I].
13Keithahn [I 978].
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TABLE I

CORRELATIONS AMONG PRICESa
PA-B PCoors

PA-B

I.0

0.83

PCoors

I.0

PPabst

a

Log

0.93

o.6I
I.0

of

real

pri

pursuing completely colluding pricing policies, which follows directly from the
nature of our estimates. If a coordinated pricing policy would yield a steeper

demand curve than the firm does face, we can conclude that a completely
coordinated pricing policy is not now being used.

Several long-term trends in the brewing industry's environment and structure
affect the specification of residual demand curves for our I962-83 sample
period. First is the question of what variables to include in the equation. The

derivation of (8) and (9) shows that variables shifting the cost curves of other
firms in the industry must be included, as must variables that shift the demand
curve for any brand. The second issue is whether the residual demand system is
stable over time.

Regarding the question of cost-side variables, w, we first include two indexes

of factor prices. One is short-run average variable cost (SRAVC) for the
industry, defined to include labor, agricultural inputs, and energy inputs.14
The other is a price of capital series (PK). A third variable is suggested by the
increasing exploitation of scale economies over time (Elzinga [i982]). If
marginal costs are falling because of exploitation of scale economies, then it is
important to capture this effect econometrically. Our variable is the average
plant size (APS) in the industry, defined to be industry-wide capacity divided

by the number of operating plants. The fourth variable is suggested not by
long-term trends but by the cyclicality of the demand for beer. If firms 3, .. ., n
have excess capacity, then their marginal costs are likely to be lower. We

capture this with the variable EKTI, defined as EKTI = In=
excess capacity of the other n -2 firms.

On the demand side, economic and marketing studies suggest the inclusion

of several economic demographic variables.15 We include per capita disposable
income (PCDI), firm advertising expenditures, the percentage of the drinkingage population under 45 years old, and the percentage of drinking-age women
who ever drink beer. Of these, only PCDI ever approaches significance in our

regressions. It is therefore the only demand variable reported below. We suspect
the insignificance arises because most demographic variables move very slowly.
On the question of structural stability, there are two important considera-

tions. One is the increasing concentration of the industry over our sample
14 See Appendix II for precise definitions of all variables.

15 Hatten and Schendal [II97]; Ellison and Uhl [i964].
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period. Two-thirds of the firms in the industry in I 962 exited before I 983; over
the same period, the five firm concentration ratio rose from 35 percent to 84
percent. Thus we allow for the possibility that residual demand curves are

getting steeper over time by interacting both their slopes and intercepts with a
variable which increases by one each year, TIME. The second issue of structural

change is the introduction of the heavily advertised "LITE" brand beer by

Miller.16 Other firms responded with the introduction of their own "light"
beers. We take account of the effect of this structural change on residual
demand by introducing a dummy variable LITE that takes in the value of I

beginning in 1975. This dummy variable is allowed to shift both the residual
demand elasticity and the intercept of the residual demand curve.

Our procedure for estimating these residual demand elasticities regresses

both Pi and P2 on the two quantities Q, and Q2, demand shift variables Y, and
industry-wide cost variables W. In double-log form, we estimate:
(20) PR= + l+ PRPR q2+ ry + Alw + vP

(2) Pi =-i70+7,q,+ 172

(2 I)
~~PR
q 12+
(2I) P2
= 120
+ qlqPR
,2q +122q2
+ 22y+ +V2
The primary econometric problem that must be solved to estimate (20) and

(2I) is the simultaneity of these equations with as yet unspecified supply
relations for the two merging firms. The solution to this problem will also prove
that equations (20) and (2I) are econometrically identified. The supply
relations are derived from equating marginal revenue with marginal cost:

(22) MC1(Qtl, W, WI; fil) = Pl + Qltl(Ql, Q2, r, W; ql, A,
(23) MC2(Q2, W, W1; f2) = P2 + Q2t2(Ql, Q2, r, W; 12, _, 1_)
Equilibrium in the industry at issue is defined by the simultaneous deter-

mination of the two partial residual demand curves (8) and (9) with the two
supply relations (22) and (23). As is evident, identification of the parameters of
the residual demand curve requires the presence of the firm-individuated cost

variables W, and W2. We therefore estimate (20) and (2i) by employing

firm-specific cost variables as instruments for quantities q, and q2. 17 In
addition, to conserve degrees of freedom, we impose a cross-equation restriction
that the different industry-wide prices W enter proportionately for both firms.
Finally we estimate partial residual demand curves jointly for the two merging

16 Miller acquired the rights to Meister Brau Lite beer in I972, which had been unsuccessfully
marketed as a diet beer for women by a small Chicago brewery. Miller's innovation was in the
nationwide marketing of light beer. Light beers, now made by many firms, are lower in alcohol and
calories than premium beers. In estimating demand curves from time series data, we implicitly

assume that no unobserved changes in product quality or reputation occur. The one exception to
this is the obvious change in the relative attractiveness of different brands after the invention of light
beer, which we treat by introducing a dummy variable in the residual demand curve of each firm.

17 In our earlier paper, we showed that even if we lack such instruments, the estimation of single
firm residual demand elasticities will be biased in the conservative direction of disproving market

power. Baker and Bresnahan [ I 984].
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TABLE II
PARTIAL RESIDUAL DEMAND CURVES FOR A-B AND COORS

Dependent: Pab Pcs
Independent

Constant
qab

I

.97 3.67
(.-71) (0.92)

-0.466

0.036

(-94) (5-35)

qcs

0.093

-o.66i

(5.6) I-I76)

SRAVC 6.I48 o.699
(0.75) (I-I7)

APS

-0.009

-0.452

(-I.Io)
PK

0-057

(2-93)

EKTI

O.OOOI9

-

0.00094

(2.2)
LITE

-

0.272

-

o.6io
(2. I 8)

qab *LITE -0.2I9

(-2.88)

qcs *LITE 0.043
TIME

0.0849
( I *57)

PCDI

0-404

-o.oI2

(0.824) (-0.007)

partners by three-stage least-squares, a procedure which takes advantages of

information available from the correlation of errors in those equations. 18
Substantial experimentation with the specification produced some simplifica-

tions. First, advertising and the demographics were never significant. Thus " r"
in (2o) and (2 I) consists only of PCDL. Second, only the slope and intercept of
A-B's residual demand equation are changed by the LITE dummy; this change
in industry structure appears to have had little effect on the other two firms.
Finally, the TIME coefficient appears to enter the intercept of each of the Pabst
and Coors equations, but not to affect the slope of any residual demand curve.
The following tables report only the estimates for specifications after these

simplifications have been imposed.19
18 If we begin with all of the structured equations of the model (I'), (2'), (3') and (4) linear
the logs with additive error, then (Io) and (iI) will have additive error, but v1 and v2 will be
correlated; Thus three-stage least-squares will increase the power of our estimators.

19 Baker and Bresnahan [ I 984] reports on the specification tests in considerably greater detail.
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Table II reports the partial residual demand curve for A-B and Coors. Most

of the coefficients have the expected signs: a decrease in either firm's quantity
would raise its own price and lower that of the other firm. If factor prices were

higher (SRAVC or PK), the residual (inverse) demand curve would shift up,
as one expects. Similarly an increase in APS (and the resulting lowering of
industry-wide costs) shifts the residual demand curve down. The coefficient of

excess capacity is of the incorrect sign but small. The demand elasticities appear
to be substantial: a one-percent quantity decrease by A-B would lower its price

by 0.466 percent, and raise Coors price by 0.093 percent-these price effects
take into account the reactions of all firms but Coors. A-B's partial residual

demand curve is somewhat flatter when the LITE dummy is turned on. Taking
into account the competitive responses of all other firms, A-B plus Coors would

have only about half as much control over p, when LITE = I.

The results for the partial residual demand curve for A-B and Pabst (Table

III) are similar in some respects. The coefficients again have mostly the ex-

TABLE III

PARTIAL RESIDUAL DEMAND CURVES FOR A-B AND PABST

Dependent: Pab Ppb
Independent

Constant

1.50

3.92

(8.42) ( I *5 7)
qab

-0.523

0o.0o

I

(-3.27) (o.58)
qpb

0.185

-0.035

(I.82) (0-077)

SRAVC

0.I33

o.o96

(1.22) (2.44)
APS

-0.I93

-0,I39

(-i.6)
PK

0.072

(2.40)
EKTI

o.ooI5

LITE

o.80s

-

0.028

-

o.ooI2

(2.68) (0.8I)

qab *LITE -o.67
(-4. I)

qpb*LITE o.oi6
TIME

-O.OI

(- I.7)
PCDI

0.249

-0.

I

I

(4- 33) ( (-0.I3)
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TABLE IV

PARTIAL RESIDUAL DEMAND CURVES FOR PABST AND COORS

Dependent: Ppb Pcs
Independent

Constant

3-96

3-34

(I!2.6) (2.20)
qcs

o.

qpb

-

i6

-

o.648

o.oo6

-0.028

(0.3I2) (- 2.6 I)

(-o0. I 6) (-I . I 8)
SRAVC

0.

I05

0.225

(I-7I) (I-44)
APS

-0.I97

(I
PK

-0.422

.39)

0.042

_

0.090

(I.66)
EKTI

0.00033

(0-503)
TIME

-O.OI

-

0.0007

I

I

-

0.04I

(- I .42) (I-39)
PCDI

-0.2I8

O.991

(-I.76) (I-37)

pected sign. A-B's demand curve is again downward-sloping in own-quantity
and increasing in Pabst's quantity. The LITE effect is again to substantially
flatten A-B's demand curve. The Pabst equation, however, shows very little
market power for the firm.

The results for Pabst and Coors (Table IV) are consistent with what one

would expect from the first two tables. Pabst has no market power, even with
the cooperation of Coors. The Coors partial residual demand curve is again
quite steep.

To use the information in Tables II-IV to evaluate mergers or collusion, we

need to estimate the residual demand curves for each of the three firms. This is
reported in Table V. The estimates show that Coors, acting alone, has a steep

demand curve. Pabst, acting alone, has very little power over price. A-B's
market power appears to vary over time, because of the effects of LITE.
Table VI summarizes the coefficients needed to evaluate the gains from a

merger or collusion. The first section reports q 1 for each firm, the inverse
demand elasticity when all other firms act independently. The second section

reports RP +PA2 the inverse demand elasticity if two firms moved their
quantities proportionately. Looking first at the A-B/Coors merger, we observe
that the A-B demand curve would be steeper after a merger with Coors. In the

I967-74 period the A-B demand elasticity grows slightly as a result of the

merger (-0.373 vs. -0.313), while it grows substantially after the "LITE"
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TABLE V

RESIDUAL DEMAND CURVES FOR ALL THREE BREWERS

Dependent: Pab Pcs Ppb
Independent

Constant

2.625

2.85

3-53

(7 77) (3-73) ( I 2. 00)
qab

-0.3I3

(-5-99)

qcs

-o.633

(I.82)

qpb

-0.028

(-0.96I)
SRAVC

0.094

0.326

o.o86

(I.8I I) (2-33) (I.8I)
APS

-0.079

-0.277

(I-I5)
PK

0.025

-0-073

_

0.082

0.024

(I.3I)
EKTI

0.0023

LITE

o.629

-

o.oo8

-

0.0023

(0-54)

-

-

(0.9I8)

qab *LITE -0.3II
(9.07)

TIME

0.042

-O.OI

I

(2.9 I) ( 2-57)

PCDI

0.II5

0-537

-0.026

(0.775) (I -50) (o. I 9)

TABLE VI

GAINS TO MERGER OR COLLUSION

I. RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITIES: t111
Coors:

-o.633

Pabst:

-0.028

(-I0.07)

(-0.96I)

A-B, i962-74: -0-3I3 (-5.99)

A-B,

II.

I975-83:

-0.002

POST-MERGER

Merger

of

A-B

(-0.0I4)

DEMAND

and

ELASTICIT

Coors:

Coors: -o.625 (-7.81)
A-B, I962-74: -0-373 (-3 45)
A-B, I975-83: -0.I76 (-2-57)

Merger of A-B and Pabst:

Pabst:

+0.024

(+O.I4)

A-B, i962-74: -0.338 (-6.28)
A-B, I975-83: -0.I5I (-2.I4)
Merger of Pabst and Coors:

Coors:
Pabst:

-o.676
+o.oI

(I

(0.

.97)
I
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dummy is turned on (- o. I 76 vs. - 0.002). Hence, as expected, a merger with
Coors would substantially increase A-B's market power. The Coors demand
curve, by contrast, grows slightly less steep as a result of the merger. We

conclude from this insignificant change that Coors' market power would be
unaffected by merger with A-B.
The merger of A-B and Pabst would be similar. The Pabst demand curve

moves from being small, negative, and insignificantly-sloped, to being small,

positive, and insignificantly-sloped. Just as Pabst is a price-taker now, so would

the merged A-B/Pabst firm be a price-taker in its Pabst product line. The A-B
demand curve, however, again grows steeper by a small amount before the

introduction of "LITE" and by a large amount after it.20 The Pabst/Coors
merger does not substantially enhance the market power of either product;

though the Coors elasticity grows slightly; this occurs because Pabst and Coors
appear to be complements in demand.
All three sets of estimates show an increase in the slope of the demand curve

only for A-B. We can determine the importance of this increase by a simple
calculation. Suppose a merger increased the inverse demand elasticity for

Budweiser, A-B's flagship product, by o.os. This is conservative: except for the

merger with Pabst in the pre-I975 period, all of our estimates show a larger
increase. An increase of 0.05 means that the price-cost margin for Budweiser
would increase by five percent of cost. A conservative estimate A-B marginal

cost is $5o/barrel. In I983, A-B sold 42 million barrels of this brand. Thus
collusion or a merger with a smaller firm would yield additional monopoly

profits of at least $ I 05 million per year.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our estimates show that collusion or a merger between A-B and either Pabst
or Coors would lead to a substantial increase in market power for A-B. No
merger among any two of the three firms yields any increase in market power

for the other two brands.21 We draw a strong and a weak conclusion about the
nature of competition in brewing.
Our strong conclusion is that these three brewers are not colluding in price,

even though there is substantial market power in the industry. The evidence for
the absence of complete collusion is compelling; a change from the pricing rules
firms now use to coordinated pricing would yield very large increases in profits.

Market power such as we measure can exist even without collusion in a
product-differentiated industry.
20 The Pabst/A-B merger suggests that our convention of assuming proportional decreases in

post-merger quantities may be too conservative. Since the post-merger Pabst demand curve
remains flat, but decreases in Pabst sales shift the A-B demand curve out, the merged firm would
find it profit-maximizing to decrease Pabst quantity much more sharply than A-B.
21 This statement presumes that the merger will not increase the probability of collusion on an
industry-wide basis. In general, we would expect mergers between larger firms to have a greater
effect on the probability of collusion. Thus we think our assessment of A-B's gains to merger is
conservative.

This content downloaded from
198.91.36.30 on Thu, 14 Jan 2021 08:32:46 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

442 JONATHAN B. BAKER AND TIMOTHY .F. BRESNAHAN

Our weak conclusion concerns the competitive role of the producers, such as
Coors and Pabst, with market shares in the 5-15 percent range. These firms
seem to provide an important brake on the pricing power of the market leader,

A-B. This conclusion is weak because data limitations prevent extension of the
analysis to other firms. First, we do not know whether our results about Coors
and Pabst also apply to the other "second tier" firms; Schlitz, Stroh, and
Heileman. We conjecture that we would also find substantial anti-competitive
effects of bilateral collusion (or merger) between any of these and A-B. Second,
the conclusion is weak because we can say nothing about the role of Miller, the
second-largest producer.
JONATHAN B. BAKER AND TIMOTHY F. BRESNAHAN, ACCEPTED NOVEMBER I984

Department of Economics,

Encina Hall,
Stanford University,
Stanford,

California,
U.S.A.

APPENDIX I*

The (inverse) demand function for firm i, the firm of interest, is

(A. I) Pi = P1(Q1 , Y, u1)

Here P1 and Q, are price and quantity for firm i 's product, Qis a vector of quan

for other firm's products, r are exogenous variables entering the demand system, a
are parameters. Q, is a typical element of Q. Qincludes Q2, as well as Q3, ... , Q,.

The model also includes (inverse) demand equations for Q the vector of quanti
of all other relevant products, including 2.

(A-2) pi =Pi (Q,,Ql,r,Yi) I i = 2 ...,In
P is a vector composed of the Pi.
The third element of the model is the supply behavior of all the firms i. Their supply
relations are written in the form marginal cost equals marginal revenue:

(A.3) MCi(Qi , W, pi) = MR'(Q Q1 ) ,..., n

The first step in deriving the single-firm residual demand is to solve

and (3) simultaneously for the vectors Qand AP.

(A-4) QW= AE(Q1, Y, W;C,)

The elasticity of Q, with respect to Q, in this partial-reduced form is

a{nE'

* A complete development of this appendix can be found in Baker and Bresnahan [ I 984].
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The residual demand curve facing firm i is derived by substituting E () into (A. I):

(A.5) P1 = Pl(Ql, E (Q, Y, W, Y,) r )
Substituting out the redundancies, we have:

(A.6) P, = R(Ql, Y, W, C, #)
where the notation R (.) means (inverse) residual demand. The arguments of the
residual demand curve are threefold; own quantity, structural demand variables, and
other firm's cost variables.

Note that the elasticity of residual demand depends on all the ordinary demand

ela4ticities and on the elasticities of other firms' reactions, {i

(A-7) 1l = 11n1 + nil il
where 4 is (inverse) residual demand elasticity, and Nil is the own- or cross- (inverse)
demand elasticity in the usual sense.

APPENDIX II

This appendix describes the sources for the variables employed in our study.
Price and Quantity

Nationwide production figures are available from trade publications, such as the yearly
Modern Brewery Age Blue Book and Brewers Almanac. Qin our regressions is annual production of the flagship brand. Per capita adjustments were made using the U.S. population
over age I8. Prices were transformed into real terms by dividing by GNP deflator.
Flagship brand prices are reported in issues of the Beverage Industhy News of Northern
California until 1978. After 1978, newspaper advertisements are used.
Factor Prices (Cost Variables)

Time series on four factors of production were assumed to apply industry-wide: labor,
materials, variable capital, and advertising. The price of labor is the average hourly
wage of brewing production workers collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, reprinted annually in Brewers Almanac. The price of variable capital is the user-cost
measure from Hazilla and Kopp [I983] for food and beverage industries, and updated
by us through the end of the sample period.
Two variants of the materials price series were used. The first uses data on the prices
and quantities of a list of specific inputs: malt, corn, rice, hops, cans, bottles, and power.
The second divides cost of materials for brewers, as reported in Brewers Almanac, by
quantity of beer manufactured in barrels. The quantities consumed of all specific inputs
are found in Brewers Almanac, except power. MBA Blue Book reports expenditures on
power. The price series for the specific inputs are from Producer Prices and Prices Indexes.
In real terms, the two materials price series are correlated at o.99. The advertising price
series is computed as an index of media prices; brewing industry weights are from
Leading National Advertisers.

Demand Variables

Population and income variables are taken from Census and other Commerce Department Sources.
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Instruments

Brewer capacity, by plant, is reported in Beer Marketer's In
K and APS. The Colorado manufacturing wage rate series is
of the United States.

Other Variables

Advertising variables, include each firm's expenditures on
Brewers Almanac. These variables are normalized either by
of advertising as described above and a population index.
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